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Abstract This article examines the importance of action-theoretical considera-
tions in European studies. By outlining the notion of ‘usage’ of the European
Union, we argue for a more systematically sociological consideration of strategic
action in the study of European transformations. The recent turns towards
constructivism and comparative political sociology allow analyzing the rationality
of political actors without falling in the trap of overly reductionist rational choice
assumptions. Concentrating on intentional action helps to reveal the importance of
three aspects of the multi-level polity: (1) informal and non-constraining
procedures; (2) the effects of ways in which actors move in between the different
levels of the European political system; and (3) the ambiguous and often surprising
coalitions that come together despite often considerable disagreement over their
final goals.
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Introduction
The relationship between sociology and European studies is a complicated one.
To be sure, sociologists from a variety of perspectives now extend their studies
to the European Union (EU) (see Favell, 2006; Guiraudon and Favell,
forthcoming). By contrast, in some parts of Europe, and most notably France,
sociology was not absent, but almost too dominant to allow for a structured
disciplinary dialog.1 In the international literature, a focus on sociological
mechanisms within the narrow field of EU studies became associated with the
constructivist turn in international relations (for example Checkel, 2005). Yet
few authors coming from sociology would categorize their work as part of this
approach, which they feel consists of a great degree of simplification and a
superficial theoretical analysis that does not reflect adequately the wealth of
insights of classical sociology. Unfortunately, this contention remains implicit
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in most studies and impedes a full-fledged dialog between international debates
and the sociological contributions with a strong empirical focus.
One of the issues that could gain from such a dialog, and the one we would
like to concentrate in this article, is the study of individual action and its role
in the transformation of the European political system. With its emphasis
on the micro-foundations of personal motivations, trajectories and behavior, a
great number of sociological studies are well equipped to contribute to the
ontological debate between rationalists and constructivists (see Jupille et al,
2003; Pollack, 2005; Checkel, 2007). Our ambition is to draw attention to
studies of intentional action in the European Union, focusing in particular on
the notion of ‘usage’ that we have developed as a contribution to the studies of
Europeanization (Jacquot and Woll, 2003; Jacquot and Woll, 2004), and to
argue for a more nuanced perspective on strategic action in European studies.
For many, strategic action belongs to the realm of rational choice theory,
not sociology.2 We argue that such an opposition is restrictive. Focusing on the
social context of intentional action reveals the constitution and effects of
strategic behavior that would be obscured by a categorical opposition between
different action motives. It is therefore quite important to study the social
construction of rational or strategic behavior.
Our article divides into two parts. We begin by situating our approach in
the recent evolution of European studies: the move away from treating the
European Union as a sui generis case and the sociological perspective on poli-
tical action. A second part presents the notion of ‘usage’ as an example of a
strategic action approach and highlights its insights, in particular (1) the
importance of informal and non-constraining procedures; (2) the effects of ways
in which actors move around in between the different levels of the European
political system; and (3) the ambiguous and often surprising coalitions that come
together despite often considerable disagreement over their final goals. The
conclusion summarizes the lessons of this research agenda.
The European Union as a ‘Normal’ Object of Sociological Inquiry
The analysis of strategic action in the European Union is part of a twin
evolution in European studies: the move away from treating the multi-level
polity as a sui generis phenomenon and the turn towards sociological
perspectives in its analysis.3
From normalization to Europeanization and back
Theory-building on European integration has concentrated since the 1960s on
international cooperation within Europe before turning to the analysis of
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policymaking within this new polity (Caporaso, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1996).
The original sui generis debate asked whether the European project was an
unusual kind of regional integration project. In the 1990s, comparativists
grew tired of the sometimes sterile debates between neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism and called for the ‘normalization’ of EU studies (Hix,
1994; Hassenteufel and Surel, 2000): they argued that the characteristics of
European policymaking are more effectively studied by comparing it to other
political systems rather than treating it as a unique case. By the end of the
1990s, comparative scholars had become quite active contributors to the study
of the European political system and relegated the macro-theories of
international relations to the background (Hix, 1994; Lequesne and Smith,
1997). With respect to some dimensions, such as voting rules or the degree of
federalism, an analysis of the EU institutions could only gain from the
comparison with any other country even if they are not necessarily alike (for
example Scharpf, 1988; Dehousse, 1994). A wealth of studies on the different
mechanisms of European institutions followed in this comparative vain.
The unique characteristics of the European Union were no longer the object
of theory-building, even if several authors provided analytical descriptions of
the ‘multi-level governance’ system (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Marks and
Hooghe, 2001) or the supranational ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1996).4 But
comparativists also grappled with the effect of the supranational institutions
on the national polities they compared and tried to understand the ‘impact’
of European integration on domestic politics. Within few years, these questions
turned into a cottage industry under the label of ‘Europeanization’
(see Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Bo¨rzel and Risse, 2006; Graziano and
Vink, 2007).
In this perspective, the ‘misfit’ model, which argues that change of domestic
politics corresponds to the more or less profound gap between European policy
proposals and national traditions, has long been most influential (Bo¨rzel and
Risse, 2000; Caporaso et al, 2001). However, several authors have criticized its
focus on institutional constraints, where policy actors are reduced to
‘mediating’ factors (Radaelli, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Jacquot
and Woll, 2004; Bruno et al, 2007).
Despite the relative insulation of Europeanization studies from more general
social science debates, the questions that were asked about European
integration actually opened the possibility of studying European politics
(again) with the tools of mainstream policy analysis, comparative politics and
sociology. The debate that emerged under the heading ‘Europeanization’ goes
beyond the study of how supranational institutions exert adaptive pressures: it
also asks what the relationship is between institutions and individual actors,
how much agency remains, and how institutions evolve. To move beyond the
misfit model to study not just institutional constraints, but also informal
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politics and the cognitive dimension of multi-level policymaking allows
understanding instances of deliberate policy changes in the absence of adaptive
pressures. The European Union can become a vector of change by providing
new resources, references and policy frames, which national policy actors use
strategically. It therefore becomes crucial to understand what motivates
these different strategies and to study the action of individual participants in
the policy process. This ties EU studies to fundamental questions of institu-
tionalist analysis and raises important epistemological and methodological
issues, in particular by shedding light on the tensions between structure and
agency or continuity and change.
A sociological perspective on political action in the European Union
The reason why sociological studies seem to talk past rational choice studies of
the European Union is that they turn the focus of inquiry on its head
(cf. Dobbin, 1994, p. 123). Rather than studying how universal laws generate
social practice, they investigate how social practices generate the logics of
European integration. The European Union is not construed as a geo-political
or institutional game, where the distribution of resources or capacities
creates incentives for action or constrains the participants, but rather as
the reorganization of ‘fields’ (Favell, 2006, p. 127), that creates new social
arrangements, opens up sites of contestation and differentially empowers a
variety of actors. The task is therefore to understand what orients individual
behavior and social practices, even in the absence of formal institutional
constraints.5
This micro-perspective is characteristic of the French contributions on the
European Union (see Smith, 2004).6 Romain Pasquier and his co-authors have
called for a ‘bottom-level’ perspective on European studies, that concentrates
on local actors and the ways in which they seize and interpret European rules
and opportunities (Pasquier, 2002; Pasquier and Weisbein, 2004; Pasquier and
Baisne´e, 2007). Others have studied collective action and the constitution of
transnational networks, with a focus on the sociology of social movements and
political engagement (Chabanet, 2001; Guiraudon, 2001; Weisbein, 2001;
Balme et al, 2002; Weisbein, 2003) or citizenship and the identification of
citizens with European ideals (Duchesne and Frognier, 2002; Strudel, 2002;
Sauger et al, 2007). More generally speaking, European public and private
actors, be they part of the political elite or regular citizens, have been central to
the analysis of change in the political system of the European Union
(Georgakakis, 2002; Joana and Smith, 2002; Costa and Magnette, 2007).
Put differently, a micro-sociological perspective highlights the ‘political
work’ of individuals (see also Jullien and Smith, 2008). Yet, in order to tie these
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insights into the theoretical debates, we need to clarify how individual action is
related to institutional change. Traditionally, intentional action has been
analyzed in the institutionalist literature either from the perspective of rational
choice theory as cost-benefit calculations7 or from a sociological perspective as
appropriate behavior (March and Olsen, 1989). In the first case, interests are
given and actors pursue them strategically, in the second, they co-evolve with
the institutional setting (see Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). This theoretical
opposition divides scholars on European integration and corresponds to the
rationalist–constructivist divide in the international relations literature.
However, many authors have criticized the debate between rationalism and
constructivism as a false opposition (Adler, 2002; Fearon and Wendt, 2002).
To be sure, the two camps are divided on a number of ontological and
epistemological questions, but rationality in itself is rather unproblematic. In
their weakest form, rational choice approaches merely make one simple
assumption: when faced with several options, an actor will chose whichever
option allows obtaining the most advantageous final outcome. Constructivists
insist on the fact that preferences are social phenomena and as such should not
be held constant. Therefore, it is not the optimization hypotheses that poses a
problem to the constructivists; it is the idea that whatever the individual value
is given exogenously and does not change.8 For them, interests are context-
dependant and multifaceted and cannot be resumed as a pure material cost-
benefit calculation. It is thus the materialism that underlies many rational
choice explanations that should be situated in opposition to constructivism,
not rationalism in and of itself.
Indeed rationality and the study of strategies are not incompatible with
a sociological perspective and need to be studied to understand how the
European polity evolves. Understanding the social origins of political
rationality clarifies the variation in strategies and highlights the cultural
nature of instrumentality (Swidler, 1986; Dobbin, 1994). In her previous work,
Woll (2008) has shown that it makes little sense to use economic ‘interests’ as
the default starting point for policy analysis, because firms adjust their
economic policy objectives in interaction with competitors and politicians.
Firms behave rationally in pursuit of their objectives, once these are well
defined. But if we want to understand the goals of their political lobbying
activities, we have to study the ‘construction of economic rationality’, which
happens as part of implicit or explicit political struggle. Similarily, both Le
Gale`s (2001) and Schmidt (2000) have shown in their respective analyzes
that reiterated confrontations between national and supranational actors can
transform stakes and thus affect policy preferences. The actors that contribute
to shape the rules of the game – in these cases the actors within the
supranational institutions – can thus induce a change in the goals pursued by
their opponents.
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With this idea in mind, Jabko (2006) has criticized constructivists for
their underestimation of strategic calculations on the part of political actors,
especially when they design policy frames. The agreement on monetary union
in Europe, for example, appears as a natural consequence of the decline of
Keynsianism. In reality, new concepts such as a ‘single market’ are used
strategically by actors, which try to create new policy coalitions. However, they
cannot control all of the consequences of their choices and will eventually
be transformed by the ones that are most effective. Labeling his approach
‘strategic constructivism’, Jabko insists on a necessary incorporation of the
study of strategic behavior into the study of the social embeddedness of
individual actors. Vivien Schmidt (2008) has regrouped analyses in this vein
under the label ‘discoursive institutionalism’, to signal where institutional
change results from the ideational and discursive work of the actors operating
within them.
In sum, the analysis of political strategies can gain from a sociological
perspective that pays attention to the origins of the goals an actor pursues and
the feedback effects a strategy can have on the identity and the preferences of
the actor. Understanding political change as the result of multiple interactions
between national and European politics helps to see that the actors at the heart
of these processes use European opportunities strategically, but are also
transformed by them in the process (Guiraudon, 2003; Sanchez Salgado, 2008).
The Usages of Europe: Strategies at the Heart of Political Work
We start from the premise that the political work of individual actors is central
to understanding the orientation of political intervention in the European
Union. Studying the ways in which actors make use of Europe helps to
understand the nature of this work: how do they seize opportunities and work
around constraints, and how do they interpret and transform both? Working
on usages is thus first and foremost an approach that defines analytical
priorities and should not be understood as a new theory or model.9 Indeed, it
merely provides a focal point for phenomena that have long been acknowl-
edged by policy analysts, such as blame shifting or multi-level games
(cf. Menon, 2008). We begin by reviewing the notion of usage and then turn
to its utility in recent studies of European politics.
The political usages of Europe
The ambition of the notion of political usages is to draw attention to the
cognitive and strategic dynamics of European transformations in order to
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caution against institutionalist analyzes that treat individual actors as simple
transmission belts. Institutional contexts need to be interpreted and actors do
not give automatic responses to political pressure: they can choose and learn
and thus develop agency independent of structural conditions. By focusing on
this agency, the notion of usages highlights how actors engage with, interpret,
appropriate or ignore the dynamics of European integration. Their behavior is
therefore central to the ways in which national political systems respond to
supranational politics (and vice versa).
We have defined ‘usage of Europe’ as social practices that seize the
European Union as a set of opportunities, be they institutional, ideological,
political or organizational (Jacquot and Woll, 2003, p. 9). It is therefore
important to distinguish between usages and the resources or constraints
provided by the European Union. Resources and constraints are a necessary
but not sufficient condition for strategic behavior. They are only contextual
element that usages are based on; actors intentionally transform them into
political practices in order to reach their goals. Making use of something
implies voluntary action and thus intended meaning, but conscious and
voluntary action does not mean that the final outcome is identical to the initial
objective, as the effects of an action are often not entirely predictable or
controllable. As strategic as usages may be initially, in the long run, it entails
cognitive and/or normative adaptation by actors and their political environ-
ment, which in turn affects their subsequent behavior and positioning.
We have categorized usages according to their functionality and distinguish
three main types (Jacquot and Woll 2003, 2004). Cognitive usage refers to the
understanding and interpretation of a political subject and is most common in
when issues are being defined or need to be discussed, so that ideas serve as
persuasion mechanism. Strategic usages refer to the pursuit of clearly defined
goals by trying to influence policy decision or one’s room for maneuver, helping
to aggregate interests and to build coalition of heterogeneous actors – be it by
increasing one’s access to the policy process or the number of political tools
available. It is the most common of all types and occurs typically in the middle of
the political process, once all stakes are clearly defined. Legitimating usage occur
when political decisions need to be communicated and justified. Actors rely on
the image of ‘Europe’ to communicate implicit content or employ related
discursive figures such as ‘the European interest’, ‘European constraints’, ‘the
application of the Maastricht criteria’ to legitimate political choices. Cognitive
usages are generally mobilized during the framing phase of a reform (which
entails problem definition and the elaboration of policy alternatives), strategic
usages are more concerned with the policy and decision-making phase, while
legitimizing usages are linked with the general public and can take place up and
downstream of the policy process (during the framing of the diagnosis and the
solutions or during the justification of the reform).
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Each of these three categories can be associated with the elements that are
typically used in its pursuit, the actors that most commonly engage in it and
political work pursued, are summarized in Table 1.
The motivations behind these different usages can be of three kinds. The first
is a logic of influence: actors try to shape the content or the orientation of
national or supranational stakes. The second is a positioning logic: here the goal
is to improve one’s institutional position in the policy process. Finally, the
third is a justification logic, where actors try to obtain the support of other
actors or the general public for decisions that are already taken.
The notion of usage makes particular references to the institutional setup of
the European Union and the academic debate on European integration, but
can in principle be extended. It has indeed been developed in the framework of
the Europeanization literature in order to give flesh to and disaggregate the
question ‘How does the EU matter?’ Its key concern are the specific resources
provided by European integration (legal, institutional, budgetary, political,
cognitive resources) and the types of actors who participate in the European
policy process – at the intersection of the supranational and the national level.
As an analytical tool, the notion of usages is consequently instrumental in
examining the interaction between the European Union and its effects on the
domestic level. However, focusing on the political work of actors can allow
more generally to grasp the mechanisms of change at work in any multi-level
polity and to shed some light on the concrete articulation between the different
levels. In this sense, the study of usages could also contribute to a research
agenda concerned with other complex institutional contexts or comparative
regional integration functioning and impact (Warleigh-Lack, 2006; Telo, 2007).
Table 1: Characteristics of the different types of usage
Elements used Type of actors Political work
Cognitive
usage
K Ideas
K Expertise
K Political entrepreneurs
K Advocacy coalitions
K Public policy networks
K Experts
K Epistemic communities
K Argumentation
K Framing of political
action
K Problem building
Strategic
usage
K Institutions
K Legal resources
K Budgetary
resources
K Political resources
K Bureaucratic actors
K Decision-makers
K Resource mobilisation
Legitimating
usage
K Public space
K Discursive
references
K Politicians
K Lobbyists, special
interests
K Justification
K Deliberation
Source: Adapted from Jacquot and Woll, 2004.
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A heuristic notion?
Studying usages reveals how the redefinition of borderlines – geographical,
sectoral or between the public and the private – has enabled actors to reinvent
their role in the political game, be it in the definition of policy stakes and
solutions or in the implementation process (Radaelli and Franchino, 2004).
Concentrating on usages allows focusing on political actions and on the
substance of political relations. It has helped to think differently about the
central mechanisms of European transformation (Radaelli, 2004): How does
the role of actors materialize? How do they appropriate the tools and resources
offered by European integration to reach their goals? Who can (or cannot)
make what type of usage of Europe and why?
By asking these questions, the analysis of usages draws attention to three
specific dimensions: (1) the dynamics of informal and non-constraining
procedures; (2) the movement of actors between the different policy levels;
and (3) the importance of networks and coalition which form among actors
with fundamentally different goals.
First, while formal procedures are important, informal procedures provide
immediate resources that can help actors to increase their room for maneuver.
One of the most illustrative examples is the open method of coordination
(OMC), an experimental form of intergovernmental policy coordination, which
has been used by some policymakers as a lever to bring about reform initiatives
at the national level (Erhel et al, 2005; Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009). In
the domain of pensions for instance, the OMC has become a resource for the
economic and financial actors who sought to modernize the retirement system
by developing employment of the elderly, cutting down early retirement
options and increasing the privately financed part of pensions (Bruno et al,
2006). In his study of defence policy, Bastien Irondelle (2003) shows that
European references became crucial for reformers of the French military in
1996, even though defence is not very integrated at the European level. What
might appear like a mere alibi of French elites to gather support for an
unpopular reform triggered a complex process of change. The references to
Europe entailed a profound discursive change within the French military,
which increasingly included European imperatives in its objectives. The
same mechanisms of resources seized in informal procedures thus operated in
both examples.
All policy processes leave open some room for maneuver and thus requires
the mediation of actors. It is not their a priori ‘degree of coercion’ that matters,
but the usages that are made of them, their concrete implementation and the
meaning that actors attach to them. Several authors have shown that the
liberalization of service sectors has resulted from the strategic and creative
expansion of competition policy instruments, which were applied in contexts
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that previously fell outside of European intervention (Schmidt, 1998;
Grossman, 2006; Woll, 2006).
This creativity brings us to our second point: the movement of actors between
different policy levels. As several studies have shown, within different policy
fields, the interpretation of rules and their usage tend to become routinized over
time (Guiraudon, 2003; Me´rand, 2008). Actors which can move around between
different sectors or policy levels are therefore crucial for importing new rules or
re-interpreting those already in place (Delazay and Rask Madsen, 2006). In this
perspective, Bereni (2004) has demonstrated how the leaders of the French
feminist movement have been able to employ institutional and cognitive
resources at the European level to exert pressure and legitimize their demands at
the national level. This ‘detour through Europe’ was crucial for advancing their
calls for equal representation in France, which national actors had previously
been able to block both legally and symbolically. Similarly, Toens (2006) ana-
lyzes how opportunities at the supranational level have enabled social associa-
tions in Germany to overcome the constraints of neo-corporatist consultation
procedures at the national level and employ innovative lobbying strategies.
Rather than looking for the often impalpable ‘influence of the EU’, the
multi-level usages of Europe allow studying whether and how the European
Union has been instrumentalized by policy actors to help them stall or advance
on their reform projects, be it through providing bargaining assets, legitimi-
zation, room for maneuver, blame avoidance or power increases (Jacquot,
2008). Focusing on the dimension of the usages is helpful to understand
domestic reform processes, because it becomes possible to investigate the actual
causal links that constitute the often invoked ‘impact of the EU on national
settings’ (Graziano et al, 2009).
Thirdly, the study of usages and strategic action allow analyzing the
heterogeneous coalitions that form around different policy issues, because they
draw attention to the difference between the cognitive frames employed and the
motivations of political actors. Distinguishing between these two is crucial for
revealing the tensions that can exist behind an apparent political agreement. To
go beyond superficial agreement helps to study the power relations between
different actors, even when they do not play out in open conflict (Woll, 2007).
Palier (2005) has called this phenomenon ‘ambiguous agreement’ and shows
how such heterogeneous coalitions have pushed for social policy reforms such
as pensions, health care or legislation on social security financing. Jacquot
(2006, forthcoming) has studied the institutionalization of gender mainstreaming
as a policy instrument. She shows that its acceptance by both conservative and
progressive actors depended crucially on the ambiguity of its meaning and
distinguishes between conformist, purist, realist and opportunist usages. Jabko
(2006) in turn shows that European integration hinged on coalitions of the
‘strange bedfellows’ that included federalists, national governments eager to
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defend their status quo, economic liberals and those that sought to counter the
pressures of globalization.
Studying the possibilities for such strategies highlights the profoundly political
nature of interventions that might otherwise appear as a simple court case, a
bureaucratic judgement or the implementation of a European directive. Scharpf
(2008), for example, has recently criticized three ruling of the European Court of
Justice concerning the right to strike and the reach of industrial agreements in
the European Union. According to him, the judges did not just implement what
had previously been agreed upon by the member-states, but went far beyond
their mandate. As firms have used the European court by hoping for such
judicial activism, trade union ended up finding themselves severely disadvan-
taged despite the fact that the existing industrial relations arrangements had
remained unchallenged within their domestic contexts. Moving arenas and being
able to appeal to a different set of images or rules is thus part and parcel of the
reconfiguration of political conflict in Europe. Concentrating on formal rules
and their implementation would leave some of the most striking features of this
transformation in the dark.
These three venues of research are both at the heart of recent developments
in European integration dynamics and underestimated or ignored in analyzes
that concentrate only on the institutional setting. Consequently, we argue that
studying usages is necessary in order to further analyze the influence of the
European Union in contemporary political changes by deciphering the
evolving balance of power around policy issues.
Conclusion
To conclude, we would like to make three observations. First of all, the increas-
ing importance of usages in European policy practice over time corresponds to
the changes in the nature of European integration. The most visible areas of
harmonization and the importance of the Community method now exist
alongside new coordination mechanisms, non-binding procedures and the
commitment to preserve national policy solutions. The multiplicity of new
governance modes in turn requires new analytical tools for studying the room
for maneuver that results from these experimental approaches to understand if
and how they lead to social and policy change.
Secondly, we would like to emphasize that not everything in the European
Union is strategic usage and that not all actors have the same action capacities.
The process of European integration opens up a large realm of possibilities for
many actors, but political work implies conflict and power relations and not all
actors are able to use the resources provided by the European Union equally.
Moreover, usages are by no means an automatic response to new options, as
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Rozenberg (2004) has shown. However, just like the study of non-decisions,
instances of non-usage give important indications about the power relations,
the configuration of interests or the constraints that curtail political innovation
through individual action.
Finally, at the theoretical level, the specificity of our approach lies in the
sociological perspective on rational action. We are interested in the incentive
systems actors face at multiple levels, but consider them to do more than produce
automatic responses by reacting innovatively and creatively in many instances
that we try to consider systematically. Moreover, even though the political work
is often strategic and can trigger change, none of the actors oversee and control
the effects of their actions entirely. As we have argued, the movement of
actors and the heterogeneous coalitions they form constitute intentional actions,
but have profound effects on the actors and their long-term objectives.
Understanding why individual initiatives succeed and fail to gather collective
support, which ideas are carried within groups and which institutional conditions
limit political creativity are therefore necessary parts of a research agenda
concentrating on the micro-level of political change in the European Union.
For traditional EU theorists, this might be an uncomfortable exercise, because
it makes the study of the European Union as complex as the study of all
human action and therefore drives another nail in the coffin of a unitary ‘EU
theory’.
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Notes
1 Bastien Irondelle (2006) has noted the ‘hegemonic’ influence of sociology over political science:
even subfields such as French international relations theory are more accurately described as
international political sociology.
2 According to March and Olsen (1989), rational choice approaches understand human behaviour
in terms of expected effects (‘logic of consequentiality’), while sociological approaches
concentrate on social reasons for action (‘logic of appropriateness’).
3 The sociological turn is arguably much larger than just action-theoretical considerations, but a
complete discussion would go beyond the scope of this article. See Saurugger (introduction to
this special issue) and Favell (2006).
4 A recent attempt to provide a new EU theory is Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) postfunctionalist
theory. Their empirical work highlights the importance of identity and not just economic
variables for the organization of political conflict in the European Union, but it remains to be
seen how far this actually constitute a ‘theory’ of European integration.
5 Institutions are here understood as formal or legal constraints, in line with traditional EU
studies. From a sociological perspective, informal institutions are, of course, equally important
(see for example Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002).
6 The distinction between national traditions is necessarily simplified. ‘French author’ refers
loosely to scholars that produce the majority of their scientific writing for a French-speaking
audience. Reviewing parts of the ‘French tradition’ allows us to make theoretical distinctions
that are relevant for the evolution of theorizing about the European Union, but we acknowledge
that this is neither an exclusive category, nor does it accurately describe all scientific production
on the European Union in France.
7 The work of Geoffrey Garret or George Tsebelis are typical illustrations of this current, as are
most articles published in the journal European Union Politics, which one could consider as the
flagship journal of rationalist approaches to European studies.
8 For Jon Elster (1986), ‘thin’ rationality only requires that an action be coherent with the
objectives of the individual, whatever they may be. Only ‘thick’ rationality, which contains an
assumption by the analyst about the goals of the actor studied, has been the target of the
sociological or constructivist critics.
9 Our approach shares a number of assumptions with what Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) have called
actor-centred institutionalism and draws from diverse currants of action theory in the more
general sociological literature.
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